Laws regulating debt or tenancy contracts limit liability of agents in the event of default, ranging from restrictions on imprisonment, bonded labor, to exemptions on assets that can be seized by lenders. This paper provides a theoretical analysis of effects of differing restrictions on bonded labor, in the context of a matching market for contracts between principals and agents with heterogenous wealth subject to moral hazard.
Introduction
A fundamental issue in contract law concerns restrictions on liability in the event of default. When borrowers or tenants default on their contractual payment obligations, lenders 1 This paper is based on Part 2 of a paper earlier circulated with the title 'Bankruptcy Law, Bonded Labor and Inequality'. We have benefited from comments from Dirk Krueger, Thomas Gall and from sem- and Osnabrueck University. Mookherjee's research was supported by NSF Grant no: SES0617874.
2 University of Frankfurt 3 Boston University have various options available to extract resources and exert pressure for repayment. These options may include seizure of assets, appropriation of future earnings, and provision of indentured labor services. Imprisonment and torture of debtors were often used in medieval and ancient societies; landlords and lenders in the informal sector in developing countries frequently use physical violence. These latter methods are costly for principals and are employed not so much for their effectiveness in extracting repayment but rather for their value in deterring future defaults. In general, different bonding arrangements are associated with differing ex post distortions and ex ante deterrence effects.
Contract law typically imposes restrictions on bonding arrangements: even ancient Greek and Roman societies imposed restrictions on debt bondage (Westermann (1955) ). Imprisonment of debtors was widespread in the United States and United Kingdom until the 19th century; the death penalty was legal in England until 1820 for certain actions by a failing debtor (Coleman (1974) , Lester (1995) ). Despite legal bans, bonded labor is still widespread in the developing world, owing to weak enforcement. 4 The Nepalese Kamaiya system is a well-known example (Joshi (2003) , Edmonds and Sharma (2005) ), rendered illegal by the Nepal government in 2000. 5 In general, the process of economic development is associated with greater legal restrictions on ex post bonding, and modern international norms on labor standards typically do not allow any bonding.
A plausible reason for this is growing concern for human rights along the process of development. In this paper we focus instead on economic consequences of differing legal restrictions on bonding. In standard formulations of contract theory in economics, it is as-4 For a description of bonded labor contracts in different developing countries see U.S. Department of Labor (2005) . 5 As the US Department of Labor report states: "Loans are a central feature for maintaining the Kamaiya system. Since Kamaiyas are generally not paid enough to meet their basic needs, many have no choice but to take loans from their master. Many also carry inherited debts, sometimes going back for three or four generations, in addition to their own. A Kamaiya burdened by debt must continue to work for the same landlord until the debt has been repaid. The Kamaiya remains bound to the landlord unless, at markets held each winter, the Kamaiya finds a new master to pay off his debt or the original master sells off the Kamaiya and his family to a new master".
sumed that agents are perfectly rational and can anticipate all relevant future consequences of contractual provisions. Such approaches have difficulty explaining why there are any legal limits on bonding at all: if borrowers voluntarily commit ex ante to an ex post bonding arrangement they should internalize all future consequences of these and trade them off against their ex ante advantages. 6 Since bonding represents a form of precommitment, allowing a wider range of bonding alternatives can widen access of agents to credit, tenancy or employment opportunities.
From this perspective, legal restrictions on bonding restrict market access, especially for poor borrowers. Indeed, it is frequently argued that default liability restrictions are inefficient and significantly impair the functioning of credit markets. The inability of a given borrower-lender pair to choose contracts with strict liability provisions restricts the set of feasible contracts, resulting in a Pareto-inferior outcome. 7 Weak liability rules limit the capacity of borrowers to precommit to repaying their loans, causing many to be excluded from the credit market. Others who do manage to secure credit are provided lower incentives to prevent default, raising default risk anticipated by lenders and the interest rates they are charged. These effects are more severe, the poorer the borrowers are. Empirical evidence supporting these claims have been made both in cross-country as well as cross-U.S.-state analysis of correlations between lender rights and access of borrowers to finance (La Porta et al (1997 , Gropp, Scholz and White (1997) , Berkowitz and White (2004) ). From this perspective, the best legal regimes are those with the strongest possible protection of lender rights.
Carrying this logic to an extreme, one is also led to question legal restrictions on bonded labor. From a consequentialist perspective, it appears to make little sense to not allow rational borrowers to commit themselves to providing indentured services to lenders should 6 Of course, this pertains to committing one's own future labor services to pay off debts, rather than the labor of others (such as one's family members). Bonding the labor of other family members appears to be quite common in both historical and modern times; these clearly raise obvious questions of exploitation. The point we are raising concerns instead commitment of one's own future services. 7 Basu (2003) and Genicot (2002) refer to this as a 'paradox of voluntary choice'.
they lack the resources to repay their loans.
The purpose of this paper is to argue that economic rationales for bonded labor provisions do exist, even in a world of perfectly rational agents. The traditional argument against legal restrictions is based on partial equilibrium reasoning, which overlooks general equilibrium effects. Legal restrictions on bonded labor can lower profits earned by principals, thereby lowering interest rates, which generates spillover gains to all agents. Such restrictions therefore frequently do not result in a Pareto-inferior outcome: we show that the general equilibrium effect (when present) always outweighs the reduction in commitment ability for certain classes of borrowers, rendering them better off. Given the presence of moral hazard on the agent's side, such redistribution can increase efficiency as well, owing to improvement of borrower incentives as a result of reduced 'debt overhang'. 8
We obtain more detailed results in the case of ex post efficient bonding restrictions. This corresponds to contexts where bonded labor services provided in the event of default exactly offsets labor supplied by the borrower to a spot market, leaving aggregate labor supply of the latter unchanged. Alternately this may correspond to creation of efficient collateral instruments, whereby borrowers can effectively commit to letting lenders seize some of the assets they own following a default. Weaker restrictions on these forms of bonding allow borrowers to effectively post more 'collateral' at 'zero transaction cost'. This can benefit poor agents that were previously excluded from the market, who gain access to credit or tenancy contracts. It also enables lenders to earn higher profits, owing to reduced default costs. But wealthier (intramarginal) borrowers are typically rendered worse off, owing to the general equilibrium impact of the rise in equilibrium profit rates.
When the number of principals is fixed and on the short side of the market, we show that all agents unanimously prefer an intermediate limit on bonding (where the equilibrium profit rate is the smallest consistent with 'full employment' of principals). Lenders of course prefer fewer restrictions on bonding. On a one-dimensional policy space relating to the bonding limit, voter preferences are thereby single-peaked, implying existence of a majority 8 However, we show that this can happen only when the bonding limit is ex post inefficient.
vote equilibrium policy. The bonding limit in the equilibrium policy rises as the wealth distribution among borrowers moves to the right. This provides a possible explanation for why stricter bonding restrictions are typically observed along the process of economic development. Moreover, consistent with available empirical evidence, stronger restrictions (i.e., weaker lender rights) are associated with reduced efficiency and higher default rates. 9
These results imply that 'appropriate' laws (defined according to either efficiency or political economy considerations) governing contractual liability vary with the level of development:
poorer countries may not wish to impose the same kind of restrictions on bonding as richer countries. 10
With regard to forms of bonding that impose ex post distortions, perfect unanimity of preferences may no longer obtain across borrowers of differing wealths. Moreover, we
are not able to obtain unambiguous results concerning the precise pattern of preferences across the entire wealth distribution. The results at the extreme ends of the distribution obtained earlier still continue to hold: allowing distortionary bonded labor can allow poorest borrowers to gain access to contracts, and select higher effort. Wealthier borrowers at the upper end of the distribution on the other hand do not employ distortionary bonding: they are rendered worse off and select lower effort when such devices are allowed. Therefore we tend to obtain similar results as in the case of nondistortionary bonding at extreme ends of the range of possible wealths. If the wealth distribution is concentrated among the poor for whom market access is the more fundamental issue, distortionary bonding will tend to be more productive and popular. The opposite will happen when the wealth distribution is concentrated at the upper end.
Section 2 introduces the model, classifies different forms of legal liability rules, and describes feasible allocations corresponding to arbitrary restrictions on bonded labor. Section 3 provides a characterization of the equilibrium of a matching market for contracts between 9 We show that this last result can be reversed in the case of ex post inefficient bonding.
10 This would be reinforced insofar as demands for human rights and freedom rise along the process of development.
principals and agents. Using this characterization, Section 4 examines general comparative static properties with respect to bonding limits. Sections 5 and 6 provide more detailed results for nondistortionary and distortionary bonding limits respectively. Section 7 discusses related literature. Finally, Section 8 concludes.
Model
The economy has a given population of m principals and n agents, in the context of a tenancy market. Each principal owns an asset such as a plot of land or equipment that requires the effort of an agent to generate income. Agents are prospective tenants who do not own the asset themselves; principals are asset owners who are unable to provide the labor necessary to generate income from these assets. Each agent can work on a given unit of the asset (referred to as a plot of land). Principals may own more than one unit of land, and there are at least two distinct principals who compete with one another. 11 The equilibrium is the same as the case where there are as many principals as plots of land, and each principal owns one plot of land, so we shall consider this setting for simplicity.
In order to generate income, the agent may need to spend an amount I to purchase necessary inputs at the beginning of the period. Each agent starts with a given financial wealth w. Principals have enough wealth to pay for the entire upfront investment. Consequently, a principal and agent pair that are matched with one another will need to agree how to share the investment costs, apart from how to share the incomes generated.
The returns to the project are stochastic. With probability e the project is a success; the state of the world will be called good, and denoted by s. In that case the project return is s. With probability 1 − e the project fails, the state of the world is bad, denoted by f , and the corresponding return is f < s. The success probability e depends on the agent's effort, which is not contractible. Without loss of generality, we can identify e with the effort of 11 Corresponding results for the case of a single monopolist principal who owns all the land can be derived from analysis of the P-optimal contracts. In this case the general equilibrium effects will not appear, and the comparative statics with respect to liability rules will be quite different. After the project has been completed, the agent can work l hours on a spot labor market and earn an income of Rl, where R > 0 is a given parameter. This opportunity arises irrespective of whether the agent participated in the project. The ex ante contract with the principal can specify an extent of labor that the agent is required to provide the principal ex post, depending on the outcome of the project and payments made by the agent. We assume that g (l) = ∞.
There is a legal limit B on the extent of bonded labor that the agent can provide to the principal. Let l * denote the ex post efficient labor supply of the agent, i.e., where 12 The assumption on convexity of marginal disutility of effort simplifies the analysis considerably, as it implies that the cost of providing the agent with appropriate effort incentives (i.e., inclusive of the incentive rents) is convex.
Contracts, Legal Regimes and Sequence of Moves
The first stage of the game involves matching of principals with agents.
At Stage 2, the principal and the agent write a contract which specifies their respective contributions to the upfront investment I, financial transfers and bonded labor obligations, contingent on the outcome of the project. A contract specifies I A , the contribution of the agent to the upfront investment, and for each outcome i = s, f the financial transfert i from the agent to the principal, and b i the bonded labor services provided ex post. A contract is
At Stage 3, the agent selects effort e.
At Stage 4, outcome i is realized.
At Stage 5, the principal and agent can replace the earlier contract with a new one, provided both agree.
At Stage 6, the agent decides whether or not to default on the contract, i.e., whether to supply the mandated financial and labor transfers.
At Stage 7, a court or third-party contract enforcer imposes penalties on the agent in the event of default at the previous stage. These penalties consist of financial transfers P and labor obligations l d ∈ [0,l] either to the government (e.g., in the form of imprisonment) or to the principal.
Finally at Stage 8, the agent decides on supplementary labor supply l s to the spot labor market, subject to the constraint that the aggregate labor supplied (across the principal, the government and the spot market) does not exceedl.
13 If the legal regime permits the contract to mandate a payment exceeding w − IA + yi, this is tantamount to allowing bonded labor, as the agent would be compelled to work on the spot labor market to be able to meet this obligation. In this paper we focus on regulations concerning bonded labor as regulations on contract liability. We therefore presume absence of any limits on default liability, and assume that these default penalties are large enough that they deter all defaults in Stage 6. We focus on contract liability since this is the common-sense interpretation of bonded labor: e.g., bans on bonded labor are usually taken to mean restriction on contracts, rather than rule out imprisonment as a penalty for breach of contract. Nevertheless our results also apply to contexts where there is no restriction on contract liability, while default liability is limited.
Contract Liability and Default Liability
14 Many European settlers coming to the United States were allowed to use indentured labor. These contracts were subject to severe enforcement problems, as indentured workers had strong incentives to run away and not serve their time for their employers. Geiser (1901) notes how "In 1713 the General Assembly of New Jersey passed a law providing that servants absenting themselves from their masters without leave, were to serve double the time of their absence and pay all costs incurred in their return". Indentured labor was not only used in the United States but different varieties of such a system were used in different parts of the world. In a description of the indentured labor system in the British Colonies, Ireland (1899, p.180) describes penalties for "unlawful refusal to work -fine not exceeding $10, or imprisonment for not more than one month." Indentured labor contracts were limited to five years: an example of contract liability. But "the time which he spends in jail must be served on the plantation after the period of five years" -an instance of default liability (Ireland (1899), p.182).
Modern laws concerning personal bankruptcy can be thought of as a combination of limitations on both contract and default liabilities. The law does not restrict financial transfers that can be specified in contracts, but does not allow bonded labor obligations. At the same time there are limitations on default liability: in the event of default, lenders may seize assets of the borrower only above some exemption limit, or appropriate some fraction of the borrower's subsequent labor market earnings. We analyze different forms of bankruptcy law in a companion paper (von Lilienfeld-Toal and Mookherjee (2007)).
Feasible Allocations
We are interested in describing allocations that may result from feasible contracts in this
setting. An allocation will specify a particular matching of agents with principals, and for any specific matched pair a state-contingent allocation of financial returns, ex post labor provided, and ex ante effort induced by these. Specifically, an allocation for a given matched pair is (e, {t i , b i , l s i } i=s,f ) which satisfies the following conditions for feasibility:
Such an allocation generates state contingent payoffs for the agent and principal respec-
, the agent's payoff net of the effort disutility. Let l i denote the aggregate ex post labor supplied b i + l s i . We may then restate the state i payoffs for the agent and the principal as
). The feasibility constraints above then reduce to
which corresponds to restrictions on financial transfers, and
the restriction on bonded labor. Incentive compatibility includes an ex ante constraint
and an ex post constraint
on supply of project effort and of subsequent spot market labor respectively. Moreover, neither agent nor the principal should be worse off compared with autarky:
Here S(R) ≡ Rl * − g(l * ) denotes the maximum surplus resulting from the opportunity of the agent to supply labor to the spot market, and
] denotes the deadweight loss or reduction in surplus that results when the agent supplies a given level l which may differ from the ex post efficient level l * .
For a matched principal-agent pair, conditions (FT),(BL),(EAIC), (EPLC), (EPIC),
(P C A ) and (P C P ) are clearly necessary for feasibility. However, they may not be sufficient, since additional restrictions may be imposed by the possibility of contract renegotiation or default at Stages 5 and 6 respectively.
Lemma 1 A pair-wise allocation ({v
i , l s i , b i , l i } i=s,f ,
e) for an agent with wealth w and a given principal is an outcome of some feasible contract between this pair, if and only if it satisfies constraints (FT),(BL),(EAIC), (EPLC), (EPIC), (P C A ), (P C P ) in addition to
the renegotiation-proof constraint: for each i = s, f :
Condition (RNP) says that the extent of bonded labor is distortionary only if there is no further scope for the agent to transfer wealth to the principal via financial transfers. If this condition is not satisfied for some state i, a revised set of contractual terms for state i can be written at Stage 5 by the principal and agent where a higher financial transfer is accompanied by smaller supply of bonded labor, which makes both parties better off.
Conversely, this condition is sufficient to ensure that the ex post allocation is Pareto efficient, so there cannot be an ex post Pareto improving renegotiation.
The proof of the Lemma is straightforward. Since there is no limit to default liability, we may as well assume that the penalty for default involves maximal financial transfer 
, l * } will generate no incentives for renegotiation or default, and will induce the agent to select these effort and spot market supply. Necessity of these conditions is obvious. 15
Definition 2 An agent with wealth w is said to be viable with bonded labor limit B if there exists a pair-wise feasible allocation
(e, {v i , l s i , b i , l i } i=s,f ),
which satisfies constraints (FT),(BL),(EAIC), (EPLC), (EPIC), (RNP), (P C A ) and (P C P ) respectively.
Clearly, an agent that is not viable cannot receive a contract from any principal: they must perforce be excluded from the market. This holds irrespective of the relative number of agents and principals, or the wealth distribution across agents. In specifying the pattern of matching, attention can be restricted to the set of viable agents.
Definition 3 A feasible allocation for the economy is a matching of principals with viable agents, and for each matched pair a pair-wise feasible allocation satisfying constraints (FT),(BL),(EAIC), (EPLC), (EPIC), (RNP), (P C
) and (P C P ) respectively. 15 The same characterization of pair-wise feasible allocations applies when contractual liability is unlimited while default liability is limited. In such a setting, the agent may be induced to default. Consider the allocation ({vi, l s i , bi, li} i=s,f , e) that actually results on the equilibrium path (i.e., from default, if it occurs), and rewrite the contract corresponding to the financial and bonded labor transfers resulting in this allocation.
The absence of limits on contract liability implies that this is a feasible contract. Since it is the actual outcome resulting from the previous contract, it must generate no further incentives for renegotiation or default, or incentives to deviate from the associated supplies of effort and labor supply. Pair-wise PE allocations can be found by maximizing linear welfare-weighted sum of utilities of the concerned principal and agent subject to the feasibility constraints (FT),(BL),(EAIC), (EPLC), (EPIC), (P C A ) and (P C P ). 16 The following results will turn to be useful later.
Proposition 5 (a) An agent with wealth w who is viable with bonded labor limit B, is
also viable with wealth w ≥ w at any bonded labor limit B ≥ B. Proof. To prove (a), note that an increase in w or B enlarges the set of allocations satisfying constraints (FT),(BL),(EAIC), (EPLC), (EPIC), (P C A ) and (P C P ). 17 Since the agent is viable at wealth w at bonded labor limit B, there exists an allocation satisfying constraints (FT),(BL),(EAIC), (EPLC), (EPIC), (P C A ) and (P C P ) at (w, B), and therefore also at (w , B ). Hence there will exist an allocation which maximizes a linear weighted sum 16 Note that we did not include (RNP) among the constraints, since any solution to the problem described above would automatically satisfy (RNP).
17 For an increase in B this is obvious: only constraint (BL) is affected and this is relaxed. With an increase in w, a corresponding increase in vs and v f preserves all the constraints apart from (P CP ), and relaxes (P CP ).
of the ex ante utilities of the pair, subject to these constraints. Any such allocation must satisfy (RNP), and is thus pair-wise feasible.
To prove (b), suppose instead b i < min{B, l * }. Then it is feasible to raise b i to l * without creating any deadweight loss. Supplementary labor supply l s i then falls to 0, while l i is unchanged at l * . So constraint (FT) is relaxed, and all others are preserved.
For (c), note first that every feasible allocation requires e > 0. Otherwise if e = 0, and the principal's payoff is w + S(R)
, so the principal's payoff is bounded above by
Next, note that (FL) cannot bind in both states in any pairwise PE allocation. Otherwise in both states
as e > 0, and (P C A ) must be violated. Hence (FL) can bind in at most one state.
We claim this must be
Market Equilibrium
Let the n agents be ordered so that w 1 ≥ w 2 ≥ w 3 . . . w n . Let m(B) be the largest integer k between 1 and n such that the agent with wealth w k is viable at bonded labor limit B. Then the market will realize matches between the m principals and m(B) agents, and assign a contract to each matched pair. We shall use the following standard definition of a stable allocation of a matching market: Our characterization of stable allocations will make use of the following definitions of polar types of contracts that correspond to allocating all bargaining power to either principals or agents. A similar characterization is obtained under more general conditions by Dam and Perez-Castrillo (2006) .
Definition 7 A P-optimal contract for an agent with wealth w is a contract
(e, {v i , b i , l s i , l i } i=s,f ) which maximizes the principal's payoff Π P ≡ w + S(R) − I + es + (1 − e)f −v f −eD (e)−eQ(l S )−(1−e)Q(l f ) subject
to feasibility constraints (FT),(BL),(EAIC), (EPLC), (EPIC) and (P C A ). Let the corresponding level of profit be denoted Π P (w, B).
An A-optimal contract for agent with wealth w relative to profit targetΠ for the
(e) subject to feasibility constraints (FT),(BL),(EAIC), (EPLC), (EPIC)
and the following participation constraint for the principal: Proof. In any stable allocation all principals must earn the same profit. Otherwise some principals will earn less than others, and the former can undercut the contracts offered by the latter to the agents they match with (i.e., offer a contract in which both v s and v f are increased by some common > 0, while all other details of the contract are unaffected).
If there are fewer viable agents than principals, then some principals will not be matched, and there will be principals that earn zero profit. Hence all principals must earn zero profit.
Every agent with k ≤ n(B) must obtain an A-optimal contract relative to zero profits, otherwise there exists a contract which gives the agent a higher expected utility and breaks even for the principal. Agents with k > n(B) cannot be matched since they are not viable.
If there are at least as many viable agents as principals, then the number of agents that will be matched will equal m, the number of principals. The m wealthiest agents must be matched, otherwise an agent k with wealth higher than the wealth of a matched agent k will not be matched. The former can then offer the principal matched with agent k the same contract, which generates the principal a higher profit owing to the higher wealth of agent k. Hence all agents with k > m will not be matched. Moreover, all agents with k ≤ m will receive an A-optimal contract relative to Π * . Finally Π * ≤ Π P (w m , B) since the latter is the highest possible profit that can be attained by a principal contracting with the agent with wealth w m . In addition, Π * ≥ Π P (w m+1 , B) otherwise any principal would do better offering a P-optimal contract with the agent m + 1.
Hence competitive allocations can be described as follows: if principals are on the long side of the market, they make zero profits. If they are on the short side they make positive profits. The equilibrium profit equals the P-optimal profit with the marginal matched agent.
All wealthier agents appropriate the entire surplus accruing from their wealth exceeding that of the marginal matched agent.
Note that the equilibrium profit is indeterminate if the principals are on the short side and the marginal matched agent has strictly higher wealth than the next wealthier agent who is excluded. If they have the same wealth (w m = w m+1 ) then this indeterminacy disappears. Otherwise there may be some surplus to be split between the marginal agent and the principal this agent is matched with. The principal's outside option is to contract with a poorer agent, while the agent's outside option is autarky. We shall adopt the convention from now on that all the surplus will go to the principal in this case, i.e., the equilibrium profit rate Π * equals Π P (w m , B). All qualitative results of this paper will remain unaltered if we replace this by an assumption of an exogenously fixed split of the surplus, as in a Nash bargaining solution.
With this convention, all the bargaining power is allocated to the principal in the match with the marginal agent. For an intramarginal agent on the other hand it is allocated entirely to the agent in question.
It is easy to check that we would obtain the same results from a Walrasian equilibrium of the contract market, where agents and principals take the 'going profit rate' as given and form utility or profit-maximizing demands and supplies of contracts respectively, and the profit rate is chosen so that the market for contracts clears.
Comparative Static Effects of Higher Bonding Limits General Results
The characterization of stable allocations helps identify the two distinct effects of raising the bonded labor limit B. The first is the partial equilibrium (PE) or precommitment effect of allowing an enlargement of the set of feasible allocations, by relaxing the constraint (BL). The second effect is the general equilibrium (GE) or profit effect. If principals are on the short side of the market and earn positive profit Π * , an increase in the bonded labor limit B may cause this profit to increase. An increase in B enlarges the set of feasible contracts with the marginal agent m. For the very same reasons as above, the principal contracting with the marginal agent is able to earn a higher profit, thus raising the equilibrium profit rate. This lowers the utility of all intra-marginal agents. The net effect on the latter then depends on the relative intensity of the PE and GE effects.
The effects on access and profits are unambiguous in contrast, and do not require a detailed analysis of the nature of the PE and GE effects:
Proposition 9 An increase in the bonded labor limit B to B > B is associated with a (weak) increase in the number of matched agents, and in the equilibrium profit.
The first part follows from the expansion in the set of viable agents as B increases, since the number of agents matched equals min{m, n(B)} and n(B) is nondecreasing by virtue of Proposition 5. The second part follows from the fact that the equilibrium profit equals the P-optimal profit for the marginal agent: the latter must be nondecreasing in B as an increase in B enlarges the set of feasible contracts in the optimization exercise describing the P-optimal contract.
Hence principals always benefit (weakly) from relaxing limits on bonded labor. If access expands, then agents that gain access will also be (weakly) better off. These follow from the PE effects alone. If agents are on the short side of the market both with B and B , then there is no GE effect, as equilibrium profits are zero both with B and B , so all intramarginal agents must continue to attain the same utility. In that case an increase in B is (weakly) Pareto-improving.
Proposition 10 Suppose the bonded labor limit is raised from B to B , and n(B ) < m,
i.e., viable agents are on the short side of the market at the higher limit B . Then the limit
B weakly Pareto-dominates the limit B.
This is the basis of the conventional intuition concerning a relaxation of limits on contract liability: by enlarging the set of feasible contracts, they enable a Pareto improvement.
We now show that in the opposite case where principals are on the short side of the market, the GE effect is potent enough to overturn the PE effect for at least some class of wealthy agents. B to B , that n(B) = m, 
Proposition 11 Suppose the bonded labor limit is raised from

i.e., viable agents are on the short side of the market to start with, and the equilibrium profit rises as a result (i.e., Π P (w m , B ) > Π P (w m , B)). Then there existsw such that agents with wealth exceedingw will be strictly worse off.
This result is based on a detailed analysis of properties of A-optimal contracts, and is relegated to the Appendix. However, the main idea is simple. The PE effect operates only for those agents for whom the limited liability constraint (BL) binds in the state i = f . It can be shown that this is not the case for sufficiently wealthy agents. Owing to their high wealth, they can already pre-commit to selecting the first-best effort without having to undertake bonded labor. A relaxation of the bonded labor limit therefore does not expand the set of relevant efforts that they can commit to. On the other hand, the equilibrium profit rate increases by hypothesis -owing to the fact that marginal agents are much poorer, principals contracting with those agents can extract a higher surplus by employing more bonded labor. The GE effect then causes their utility to decrease. In this case, the rise in bonded labor limit results in a redistribution of profit from wealthy agents to principals.
Nondistortionary Bonding
In order to obtain more detailed results, we focus now on the case where bonding is nondistortionary. In this case we obtain a more complete description of effects of rise in bonding limits on utilities and effort of agents at different wealth levels. 
Proposition 12 Consider an increase in bonding limit from
(b) If n(B) < m, n(B ) ≥ m then equilibrium profit rise (weakly); the agent with wealth w m benefits (weakly), while wealthier agents with k ≤ n(B) are (weakly) worse off; (c) If n(B ) < m then the equilibrium profit is zero both before and after the change, which is weakly Pareto-improving; the utility and allocation of all agents with k ≤ n(B) is unaffected, while those who gain access to contracts (weakly) benefit.
In this case, intramarginal agents who are matched before and after the change in bonding limit are (weakly) worse off. They are strictly worse off if the number of matched agents is unchanged (i.e., when the equilibrium profit rate is positive before the change) and the marginal agent is sufficiently poor (case (a)). In this case equilibrium profits rise, and the rise in bonding limit results in a uniform lump-sum redistribution from matched agents to principals. Here the GE effect operates in isolation. When the marginal agent has intermediate wealth (case (b)), there is also a redistribution, but this is accompanied by an increase in efficiency (total social surplus), and effort (i.e., project default rates decline). Both GE and PE effects operate in opposite directions for intramarginal agents: the former dominates in determining the effect on their utility, while the latter dominates in determining the effect on efficiency and effort.
On the other hand, if the number of matched agents increases as a result of a rise in the bonding limit, a set of poor agents gain access to contracts, and may benefit as a result. In this case wealthier agents do not benefit in utility terms, so the interests of intramarginal agents are opposed to those of poor marginal agents (and of principals) are opposed to one another.
The proof of this Proposition is based on detailed analysis of the structure of P-optimal and A-optimal contracts, and is provided in the Appendix. It turns out that these respective optimal contracting problems are convex optimization exercises, which permit a detailed and complete analysis of the comparative static effects. In particular, the PE effect is weaker for wealthier agents (owing to their greater ability to pre-commit owing to higher ability to make a down-payment or advance payment to the principal), while the GE effect operates uniformly for all matched agents. Hence the utility effects on agents of disparate wealths are ordered: wealthier agents benefit less from the increase in bonding limit. It is possible to sign the utility effects for the marginal agent in case (a) by direct analysis of the P-optimal contract. The increased bonding limit permits the principal matched with the marginal agent to reduce the informational rent of the latter. Hence the marginal agent cannot benefit, and therefore neither can any wealthier agent. The reduction of informational rents allows the principals to induce greater effort from the agents, which raises efficiency owing to the fact that effort is under-provided relative to the first-best. So in cases where equilibrium profit is positive, there are no effects of raising bonding limits on the set of agents that have access to contracts; increasing bonding limits then is a way to redistribute rents from agents to principals that may enhance efficiency.
The preceding results have interesting implications for the political economy of bonding regulations.
Proposition 13
Let B * denote the largest bonding limit such that the P-optimal profit for agent with wealth w m is zero: This proposition shows that despite their heterogeneity of wealth, all agents share the same preferences over the bonding limit: their most preferred limit is B * , the highest level at which equilibrium profits are zero. 19 All access effects arise at bonding limits below B * ; raising the limit from any B below B * to B * benefits agents that gain access and leaves all others unaffected. Raising the limit above B * causes the same set of agents to be matched, and the profit rate to rise, so matched agents receive lower utility.
Continue to assume that the set of possible bonding limits all entail no distortions, i.e., the policy space is 0 ≤ B ≤B ≤ l * , while B * <B. Every principal and agent has single peaked preferences over the bonding limit: for principals the peak is at the highest conceivable bonding limitB, while for every agent the peak is at B * . Assuming that there are more agents than principals to start with (n > m), the outcome of majority rule will be the limit B * , under some weak assumptions about how ties are resolved. 20
It is interesting to examine how the majority-winning policy B * varies with the wealth distribution. Suppose we compare two societies identical in all respects, except that agents are wealthier in society R than in society P in the sense of first order dominance. Then the marginal matched agent m in society R will be wealthier than in society P, i.e., society R will have a lower bonding limit. 21
This provides a possible explanation for why the process of development is associated with an evolution towards lower limits on bonding. Higher levels of development can be associated with greater availability of liquid assets that agents can use as collateral to precommit to high effort. There is then less need to employ bonded labor as a commitment device, i.e., the PE effect is weaker. The GE effect on the other hand gets reinforced, as there are more viable agents competing for contracts, which tends to raise the equilibrium profit rate at any given level of bonding.
This argument bears some resemblance to historical explanations for reduced reliance on debtor imprisonment in the UK and USA in the course of the 19th century. Coleman 20 Agents k > m will never obtain a contract so will be indifferent between all bonding limits, while there will be an equal number (m) of agents and principals with opposing preferences. Hence there will be a tie between B * andB. It is reasonable to suppose that agents with wealth below wm will vote for B * over B, e.g., if they vote at a prior stage where they are uncertain about what their initial wealth will be, they will strictly prefer the bonding limit B * overB. Alternatively, they are more likely to be altruistic towards other agents rather than principals, so the same result obtains if they resolve ties to favor agents rather than principals. Note also that if some principals own more than one asset, then the number of principals is even smaller, and the result would be further reinforced. 21 Recall from the definition of B * that it is the largest B such that πP (wm, B) = 0. The result follows from the fact that the P-optimal profit is rising in wealth and in the bonding limit.
(1974) argues that this owed substantially to development of financial instruments by which borrowers could commit to as forms of collateral, that were substantially less distortionary ex post than imprisonment. The development of such collateral instruments can be interpreted as a rise in w for all classes of agents: once these became available there was less need to rely on threats of imprisonment for defaulting borrowers to enable them to gain access to loan contracts.
Conversely, Klein and Roberts (1994) argue that the resurgence of 'pawning' of family members in French West Africa in the 1930s owed to the economic misery following the collapse of crop prices, combined with absence of alternative means of security. As they describe the institution, a 'pawn was a person transferred from one kinship group to another as security for a loan...the decision was usually taken by the household head...In the absence of clear title to land or any other mortgageable possessions, people became the only possible form of security...The creditor fed and lodged the pawn, who worked for him until such time as the debt was repaid.' (Klein and Roberts (1994, p.305 )) The incidence of pawning rose sharply in the early 1930s, owing partly to poor harvests, collapsing peanut prices, and inflexible tax demands of the French colonial administration. They go on to state that 'In societies where famine was a regular occurrence, pawning was a traditional survival mechanism....The problem, however, was in the process of resolving itself. Incomes were already rising, and they were to rise even more after World War II....Our oral sources have suggested that in French West Africa it disappeared quickly after the war....When disaster struck again in the years after 1968, pawning seems not to have been a serious option to those in need. By this time, fathers no longer had the same control over their families, there were relief supplies available, and for most, there were other sources of credit available.'
(op.cit., p. 316).
Of course, the ceteris paribus assumption underlying our explanation can be questioned:
higher levels of development are not associated only with a rightward shift of the distribution of collaterizable assets. The supply of assets and credit can expand, i.e., m can increase, which tends to lower w m for a given wealth distribution, and thus raise B * . Expansion on the supply-side can moderate the effects of rightward shifts in the distribution of wealth or of alternative collateral instruments.
Distortionary Bonding
Results are less clear-cut concerning distortionary bonding. The key analytical difficulty here is that the problem of finding P-optimal or A-optimal contracts entails a nonconvexity.
When bonding is distortionary, the deadweight losses of bonding have to incorporated as a cost. As shown in Proposition 5, distortionary bonding arises only in the failure state. The ex ante cost of these distortions equals (1−e)Q(b f ), where b f > l * if bonding is distortionary. 22
The extent of bonding increases with the effort to be implemented, and decreases with the wealth of the agent. For instance, in the A-optimal contract relative to profit target Π * , the extent of bonded labor corresponding to a given (e, w) pair is the smallest b for which
Expressing this as b f (e, w), the distortionary cost of bonded labor entailed in implementing e for an agent with wealth w is (1 − e)Q(b f (e, w)). This cost is non-convex in e: a rise in e necessitates a higher level of bonded labor, but at the same time it makes it less likely that the project will fail, i.e., the bonded labor obligation will have to be discharged. The marginal cost of effort e equals
and it is difficult to say how this varies with e or with w. Therefore it is difficult to predict the optimal contracting patterns across agents of differing wealths. Nor is it easy to describe the effects of small changes in the bonded labor limit.
Accordingly, we shall restrict attention to the effects of allowing unlimited bonded labor (B =l) with the case where none is allowed (B = l * ), and where there is no upper limit to 22 In this case the agent oversupplies labor to the principal, and will therefore not supplement it with additional supply to the spot market. Hence aggregate labor supply equals b f when it exceeds l * .
the disutility of bonded labor (g(l) = ∞). (0)), and the curvature of the disutility function is limited as follows: In this case welfare effects on marginal agents can be identified. If no agents gain access as a result of eliminating restrictions on distortionary bonded labor, marginal agents will be weakly worse off, just like sufficiently wealthy agents who also will be weakly worse off (as per Proposition 11). However, unlike the case of nondistortionary bonding, we are unable to sign welfare effects for intermediate agents.
(d) Suppose in addition that all bonded labor is distortionary (i.e., R < g
General results concerning efficiency or effort effects are also difficult to obtain. Part (c) says that there exist ranges of wealth over which efficiency declines whenever profits rise. Part (d) provides a more detailed description of effort effects that can be obtained for environments in which regularity condition (RC) holds. This condition restricts the curvature of the disutility function enough to ensure a single-crossing condition for the effort cost function in the A-optimal contracting problem.
To explain this condition in economic terms, note that agents (that are not wealthy enough) need to supply more bonded labor to be able to commit to increase effect. Condition (RC) ensures that the incremental cost of this distortion is lower for poorer agents. One reason this is true is that the expected cost of the distortion multiplies the associated deadweight loss with the probability that the bonded labor will have to be supplied, which equals the effort of the agent. A benefit of raising effort is to reduce the likelihood that this event will arise. Since poorer agents supply more bonded labor (for the same effort), this benefit is larger for them, i.e., which lowers the net marginal cost of raising effort. This effect is counteracted by the fact that the marginal deadweight loss rises with the extent of bonded labor: this raises the marginal cost of effort for poorer agents. Condition (RC) ensures that the former effect dominates. When the effort disutility function is linear (with a constant slope G that exceeds R, andl = ∞), this condition is automatically satisfied.
Under condition (RC), the expected marginal cost of raising effort is lower for poorer agents. This single-crossing property implies that A-optimal effort is higher for poorer agents, as long as distortionary bonded labor is used. Not all agents will, however, use such forms of bonding. Sufficiently wealthy agents (those aboveŵ in Figure 1 ) will have no need to employ them since they can achieve first-best outcomes despite their absence.
Agents with wealth slightly belowŵ will also not use them since they are close enough to the first-best without such bonding, and even a little bit of bonding entails first-order distortionary costs. Hence there will exist a range (w,ŵ) over which no distortionary bonded labor will be used. Over this range, effort must be strictly increasing, hence all such agents must select less than first-best effort. If distortionary bonding allows principals to earn more profits from poor marginal agents, some of these agents would have achieved the first-best when profits were lower, but are prevented owing to the rise in profits when distortionary bonding is allowed. Hence there will exist a range of wealths just belowŵ where agent utility, effort and efficiency will all decline when distortionary bonding is permitted. 23 This is a distinctive feature of distortionary bonding: it may actually induce lower effort and efficiency owing to the general equilibrium effect.
For agents beloww, distortionary bonded labor will be used. For them the value of being able to raise their efforts closer to the first-best exceeds the distortionary cost of bonding.
It can be shown that under (RC), all agents beloww will use distortionary bonding, and over this range the effort will be falling in wealth (as illustrated in Figure 1 ). It is possible therefore that for poor agents, effort rises when distortionary bonding is allowed: for some of them it may even rise above the first-best level. It is also possible that for such agents the commitment value of bonding may outweigh the higher profits that the principals can earn, though we know (from part (a)) this cannot happen for the poorest agents that are matched. Braverman and Stiglitz (1982) discuss the role of bonded labor in motivating effort incentives and risk-taking, but do not provide a welfare analysis. Srinivasan (1980 Srinivasan ( , 1989 examines determinants of worker preferences for bonded labor clauses vis-a-vis credit contracts where default is followed by denial of credit in the future, and their effects on technological innovation. However, he does not provide a welfare analysis of bonded labor laws.
Related Literature
Our analysis is more closely related to Genicot (2002) , who provides an argument for banning bonded labor used by a monopolistic landlord to preempt competition from a moneylender who cannot employ bonded labor. In her model, banning bonded labor generates greater competition between the landlord and the moneylender, and thus may increase welfare for poor farmers. This is similar in spirit to our GE effect.
The contrast between partial equilibrium and general equilibrium effects of imposing legal restrictions on contracts is also similar to arguments presented by Bardhan (1989) , Basu (1989) , Basu and Van (1998) and Kanbur (2001) . Basu (1989) investigates the welfare implications of banning sexual harrasment on the workplace. In Basu and Van (1998) a ban of child labor is analyzed. While banning child labor renders every family (slightly) worse off in partial equilibrium, these effects might be overturned by the general equilibrium impact on the wage rate. Braverman and Stiglitz (1982) also discuss cases of interlinked labor-credit or tenancy-credit contracts which may be welfare reducing for either landlord or workers when general equilibrium effects are taken into account.
Conclusion
To summarize, our analysis identifies general equilibrium effects of removing restrictions on bonded labor, that outweigh the benefits of enhanced commitment ability and cause welfare of some classes of agents to fall. This is generally true for agents that have access to contracts before and after the restrictions are lifted in the case where bonding is nondistortionary. It is true in a more restricted sense when bonding is distortionary: we showed it for sufficiently wealthy agents and for the poorest agents that have access to contracts.
On the other hand, bonding may allow a range of poorer agents to gain access, and often induces an increase in effort that lowers project failure rates. Therefore bonding tends to be favored by principals and poor agents that gain access to contracts as a result, and opposed by wealthier agents. Countries where agents are poorer on average, or lack other collateral instruments, are therefore likely to be more permissive with respect to debt bondage. The process of development which tends to raise wealth of agents and create a larger range of collateral reduces the need for debt bondage as a commitment device for poor agents to gain access to tenancy and credit contracts. Wealthier agents benefit from imposing a ban on bonded labor, creating political pressure for restrictions on debt bondage. Such forms of redistribution typically lower efficiency if bonding devices are nondistortionary, though not necessarily when bonding is distortionary.
In a related paper (Lilienfeld-Toal and Mookherjee (2007)) we examine the role of general equilibrium effects in explaining differences in personal bankruptcy law across different regions or countries. As explained in Section 2, modern bankruptcy law can be interpreted as a restriction on default liability, combined with a ban on bonded labor. Our companion paper provides an explanation for why these restrictions often take the form of an exemption limit on assets of borrowers that can be seized by lenders in the event of default, and determinants of the size of these exemptions. It also extends the model to a context of variable loan or project size, and develops testable predictions concerning the effects of varying exemption limits on the distribution of loan access, interest rates and loan sizes for borrowers at differing wealths.
In future work, we hope to extend the model to a dynamic framework, where debt can be carried forward into the future. This kind of framework may be useful to understand the impact of varying legal rules concerning lender rights in the event of default, on the dynamics of the distribution of wealth.
Clearly e is implementable if and only if there exists v f , l f ∈ [0, B] such that (FEA) is satisfied. For this it is necessary and sufficient that
The set of implementable efforts forms an interval because the left hand side of (FE) is concave in e, while the right hand side is linear in e. Let this interval be denoted [e 1 (w, Π), e 2 (w, Π)].
Note that e is not implementable if and only if
where
Given an implementable e, the smallest l f ≤ B will be selected to implement it. This is given by
l(e, w), if w > w 1 (Π, e) and w − I − Π + P (e) + g(l * ) < 0;
where l(e, w, Π) solves for l in the equation
Moreover, v f will be set equal to
Therefore the objective function reduces to expression U . 
Lemma 17
, sets e = e F and l = l * .
(c) If w < w 2 (Π, e F ) then the first-best is not implementable.
Proof. (a) is obvious. For (b) note that if w > w 2 (Π, e F ) then l(e f , w, Π) = l * , and it is feasible to achieve first-best utility with e = e F and l = l * . For (c) then l > l * is needed to implement e F , so the first-best utility is not achievable.
Proof of Proposition 11:
Suppose the profit rises from Π to Π . Then w 2 (Π, e F ) < w 2 (Π , e F ). Consider any wealth between these two thresholds: an agent with such a wealth will achieve the first-best at Π but not at Π . Moreover, for all agents with wealth above w 2 (Π , e F ), the effort will remain at e F before and after the change, and their utility declines by Π − Π.
Lemma 18
Suppose B ≤ l * . Then the P-optimal profit of a principal contracting with an agent with wealth w equals
and optimal effort is given as follows (where e * denotes the maximizer of e(s − f ) − eD (e):
The agent's expected utility in case (a) equals α(e * ) − RB which strictly exceeds w + S(R).
In cases (b) and (c) the expected utility equals w + S(R).
Proof. In the case where B ≤ l * , we have Q(l) = 0 for every l ≤ B. Therefore expression
(1) for the expected cost to the principal of implementing e reduces to max{eD (e)+S ( Proof. The first part follows from applying Lemma 16 to the case where B ≤ l * . For the second part, note that if an agent is viable, there will exist at least one level of e at which (AOP) is satisfied. Since e * is the level of e where P (e) is maximized, it will be satisfied at e * . Since P is concave, the set of implementable efforts will be an interval. If e F is implementable then the unconstrained optimum which is achieved at e F , is implementable.
This happens when P (e F ) + w + RB − I − Π ≥ 0. If this condition does not hold we have P (e F ) + w + RB − I − Π < 0. Recall that e F is the maximizer of e(s − f ) − D(e), so P (.) is strictly decreasing at e F . Hence the set of implementable efforts is bounded above by e F , implying that the A-optimal effort is the highest e which is implementable, i.e., must equal e(w, Π|B). have (using Lemma 18) the contract for w m involve effort e * both before and after. In this case the P-optimal profit, therefore the equilibrium profit, rises by R(B − B).
Proof of Proposition
Next consider the equilibrium contract for all wealthier agents. Since equilibrium profit rises by R (B − B) , the set of implementable efforts (i.e., satisfying (AOP)) is unchanged, and hence the A-optimal effort is unchanged, while the level of utility achieved falls by the extent to which profits rise.
Next, defineŵ = α(e F ) − S(R) − RB. If w m >ŵ then the P-optimal contract for w m is unchanged (vide Lemma 18). Hence the equilibrium profit is unchanged, and so is the utility of every agent.
Finally, if w m lies in betweenw andŵ, then the P-optimal contract will satisfy (P C A )
as an equality both before and after the change, so the utility of w m is unaffected. But the P-optimal profit will rise, because (BL) is also satisfied as an equality before and after the change. Therefore all wealthier agents will be worse-off. To examine the change in the equilibrium (A-optimal) contracts for the latter, note first that the rise in profit cannot exceed R(B − B), the increase that would have resulted in the P-optimal contract with w m , had (P C A ) not been binding. Therefore constraint (AOP) will be relaxed for wealthier agents, and a larger set of efforts will be implementable. From Lemma 19 it follows that for agents already at the first-best, the effort will not change, while for others it will increase.
Since P (.) is concave, the constraint will relax more for poorer agents, i.e., the increase in effort will be larger for poorer agents. Moreover, since e(s − f ) − D(e) is also concave, the increase in surplus will be larger for poorer agents.
In case (b), the agent with wealth m was excluded at B but gains a contract at B , which makes this agent weakly better off as every contract satisfies (P C A ). If n(B) < m equilibrium profit equals 0 at B, so it rises weakly when B rises to B . Therefore all agents with contracts at B must be weakly worse off. The argument in case (c) is obvious.
Proof of Proposition 14:
In case (a), note that in the P-optimal contract the (BL)
constraint cannot be binding if B =l and g(l) = ∞. Hence only (P C A ) will bind, so the poorest matched agent will receive the same expected utility equal to its outside option.
The This is because the latter equation implies that P (e) = (1−e)Q (b f )
∂e , so we need to check that Therefore (RC) implies that the expected cost function of implementing e satisfies a single-crossing property with respect to w whenever distortionary bonded labor is used.
Hence among agents selecting b f > l * = 0, the A-optimal effort will be decreasing in wealth.
Finally note that since all bonded labor is distortionary, agents with wealth slightly below the levelŵ ≡ w 2 (e F , Π) at which the first-best effort e F just becomes implementable will not select any bonded labor -the benefits of using some will be to increase effort towards the first-best, which will be a second-order benefit, outweighed by the first-order cost of the bonded labor. Hence an interval of wealths belowŵ will not choose any bonded labor. The wealthw where some bonded labor will begin to be used, is where the marginal benefit of increasing effort slightly, exactly equals the marginal cost of bonded labor at b f = 0. Below this wealth level, the marginal expected cost of bonded labor is smaller than atŵ by virtue of (RC), so they will all choose bonded labor. Over the range of wealth beloww, therefore, effort must be strictly decreasing. For agents betweenw andŵ that do not choose any bonded labor when it is allowed, the only impact of allowing bonded labor will be through the change in equilibrium profit. Since they select less than first-best effort, efficiency and effort falls for such agents when profits rise. This completes the proof.
